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It was the best of times, and the worst of times.  It was a time of great expectations, dashed 
hopes, and surprising plot twists. It was the five-year period following China‘s December 2001 
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
Nearly all analysts predicted that China‘s agricultural imports would rise sharply after it 
joined the WTO. The United States (U.S.) and other agricultural exporting countries anticipated 
―the best of times‖ after WTO accession as China lowered barriers, experienced faster growth, 
and increased its imports of grains, oilseeds, and livestock products (Lohmar, Hansen, Hsu, and 
Seeley, 2002). Many analysts in China anticipated ―the worst of times‖ for the country‘s small 
farmers  who  would  be  unable  to  compete  with  low-priced  imported  commodities  from 
developed countries.  
At first glance, the projections appear to have been correct. China‘s agricultural imports 
(using the United States Department of Agriculture‘s (USDA‘s) definition which excludes fish 
and forest products) nearly tripled from $10.5 billion in 2001 to $30.6 billion in 2006 (Figure 1). 
However, a closer look reveals that China‘s agricultural trade did not evolve quite as expected. 
Most analysts expected a broad-based increase in imports of grains, other field crops, meat, and 
dairy  products  but  the  growth  in  imports,  has  been  concentrated  in  a  narrow  range  of 
commodities. It was ―the best of times‖ for U.S. soybean and cotton exporters. Soybeans and 
cotton combined accounted for nearly half of the $20 billion increase in China‘s agricultural 
imports from 2001 to 2006 (Table 1). Natural rubber and palm oil accounted for another one-
fifth of the import growth. That means 70% of the growth in China‘s agricultural imports came 
from just four commodities.
1  
                            
* The views expressed here are those of the author, and may not be attributed to the Economic Research Service or the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. The author thanks Francis Tuan, Bryan Lohmar, Ed Allen, Steve MacDonald, Rick 
O‘Meara, William Tierney, and Mary Anne Normile for providing comments on earlier drafts of the paper. 
1 Other descriptions of China‘s recent agricultural trade trends can be found in Gale (2005, 2007), Tian (2006), and Bao 
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Figure 1:  China’s Agricultural Imports and Exports, 1995-2006 
 
It was ―the worst of times‖ for those predicting that China would import corn and wheat. 
Much of the ex ante analysis of WTO impacts focused on the potential for grain imports, yet 
cereal imports accounted for less than 2% of China‘s agricultural import growth. Projections of 
China‘s transition to corn net importer are consistently pushed further into the future. China‘s 
wheat imports also failed to meet expectations. 
The surge in agricultural imports has not led to ―the worst of times‖ for Chinese farmers. 
The  imports  that have grown  the  most  are  commodities  that  do  not compete  directly with 
products  of  most  Chinese  farmers.  Natural  rubber  and  palm  oil  are  tropical  products  not 
produced  in  significant  quantities  in  China.  Vegetable  and  fruit  imports  consist  mainly  of 
cassava and tropical fruits from Southeast Asia. Imports of apples and citrus occupy high-end 
market niches and do not compete directly with Chinese fruit. 
There have been complaints about imports from domestic soybean and cotton growers, but 
demand  for  these commodities has  grown  so strongly  that  production  and  prices  for  these 
commodities did not decline despite the flood of imports. In addition, many Chinese farmers 
benefited from improved export opportunities. China‘s agricultural exports grew at a steady 















Source: ERS calculations using China Customs Statistics 
Note: Definition of ―agricultural‖ excludes fish and forest products and 
includes unprocessed cotton, wool, and animal hides 
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Table 1: Composition of China’s Agricultural Import Growth, 2001-06 
HS codes  Commodity 
Change,  
2001-06  Share of change 
    $million  % 
NA  All agricultural*  20,071  100.0 
       
5201  Cotton  4,797  23.9 
1201  Soybeans  4,680  23.3 
4001  Natural rubber  2,438  12.1 
1511  Palm oil  1,871  9.3 
1507  Soybean oil  779  3.9 
07, 08  Fruits and vegetables  917  4.6 
41  Animal hides and skins  761  3.8 
5101  Wool  470  2.3 
04  Dairy products  346  1.7 
10  Cereals  213  1.1 
  Other agricultural  2,798  13.9 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations using China Customs Statistics reported by World Trade Atlas 
*Agricultural includes HS codes 01-20, excluding fish and seafood, plus unprocessed animal  
hides, cotton, and wool 
Note: Table shows change in calendar-year agricultural imports between 2001 and 2006 
 
Five years after WTO accession, China maintained its self-sufficiency in traditional staple 
crops while its reliance on imports of soybeans and cotton increased sharply. Calculations based 
on  USDA/Foreign  Agriculture  Service  (FAS)  estimates  show  that  China‘s  ratio  of  domestic 
production to consumption for rice, wheat and corn rose from 80-90% in 2003 to 100% or higher 
in  2006  (Table  2).  China  is  also  near  self-sufficiency  in  rapeseed.  In  2006,  China‘s  soybean 
production met only 35% of its consumption and its cotton production met 75%. 
Two Commodities: Corn and Soybeans 
The remainder of this chapter looks more carefully at China‘s trade in two commodities—corn 
and  soybeans—that  followed  contrasting  trends  in  trade.  The  corn-soybean  story  illustrates 
how China‘s actual trade patterns do not always follow trends predicted by economists based 
on fundamental tariff and price relationships.  
Corn  and  soybeans  are  both  land-extensive  crops  in  which  China  does  not  have  a 
comparative advantage. Both commodities were traditionally staple food grains in China, but 
are now used primarily for animal feed and cooking oil. Soybean imports were liberalized in 
the 1990s to encourage livestock industry development. Corn remains a strategic commodity 
since it is still considered by many policymakers to be a staple grain and is widely grown by Gale  Chap.3:  A Tale of Two Commodities     69      
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Chinese farmers (corn output is nearly 10 times soybean output in China). It is the primary crop 
in northeastern provinces which were hit hard by economic restructuring in the 1990s. 
 
Table 2:  China Self-Sufficiency in Major Crops, 1996-06 
 
Year  Rice  Wheat  Corn  Rapeseed  Soybeans  Cotton 
  ----------------------------%------------------------- 
1996  103  103  121  100  92  100 
1997  106  113  95  97  95  114 
1998  104  101  117  79  76  115 
1999  104  104  109  73  62  86 
2000  98  90  88  83  58  89 
2001  91  86  93  94  54  96 
2002  90  86  96  100  47  78 
2003  85  83  90  96  45  72 
2004  96  90  99  98  43  83 
2005  99  96  102  95  37  68 
2006  100  103  102  93  35  75 
 
Source: ERS calculations based on USDA/FAS, PSD 
Note: Table shows ratio of domestic production to domestic consumption. Inventories are 
 not considered in the calculation 
 
Studies conducted in the 1990s found positive rates of protection for both commodities 
(Martin, 2003; Huang, Chen, Rozelle, and Tuan, 2003). At the time of WTO accession, China‘s 
domestic prices for corn and soybeans were both well above U.S. prices. The price of soybeans 
in China‘s main production area (Heilongjiang Province) was 32% above the U.S. farm price 
(Figure 2), while the corn price in China‘s corn production areas (Jilin Province) was 47% above 
the U.S. farm price (Figure 3). Domestic Chinese prices of corn and soybeans are higher in 
coastal areas where many of China‘s feed mills and oilseed-crushing plants are located. 
After  WTO  accession,  imports  of  both  soybeans  and  corn  were  subject  to  low  tariffs. 
Soybean imports were assessed only a 3% tariff with no quota on imports, a regime that was in 
place before WTO accession. For corn, China agreed to set annual tariff rate quotas (TRQs) after Gale  Chap.3:  A Tale of Two Commodities     70      
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WTO accession that would allow imports of up to 7.2 million metric tons (mmt) at a 1% tariff.2 
China also agreed to end expor t subsidies, a policy that was expected to cut off China‘s corn 
exports. Most analysts expected China‘s corn exports to tail off and its imports to rise after WTO 
accession in this more liberalized trade regime.  
While  the  fundamental  price  relationships  of  Chinese  vis-á-vis  U.S.  corn  and  soybeans 
appear to be similar, the trends in trade in the two commodities were quite different. China‘s 
imports of soybeans nearly tripled from 10 mmt in 2001/02 to 28 mmt in market years 2005/06 
and 2006/07, as its demand expanded rapidly (Figure 4). China‘s imports of corn remained 
insignificant and China remained a net exporter of corn. Net exports of corn were 5.3 mmt in 
2006/07, down from 8.6 mmt in 2001/02. 
Figure 2:  Comparison of China and U.S. Soybean Prices, December 2001 
 
Source: U.S. Dept. Agriculture, customs statistics, and China National Grain and Oils Information Center 




                            
2 32% of the corn quota was to be made available to all end-users. The remaining 68% was reserved for China‘s state 
trading company. 
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Figure 3: Comparison of China and U.S. Corn Prices, December 2001 
 
Source: U.S. Dept. Agriculture and China National Grain and Oils Information Center 
*Calculated by author; tariff assumed 1%, value added tax 13% 
 
Did China protect its corn market from imports? Apart from tariffs, China utilized several 
other  measures  that  may  have  protected  domestic  commodities.  One  major  policy  is  the 
differential treatment of domestic and imported commodities for assessing the 13-percent value 
added tax (VAT). The VAT is assessed on the gross value of imported commodities, but Latner 
and Jiang‘s (2007) analysis suggests that domestic commodities are assessed a lower effective 
rate due to exemptions for farmers and several categories of farm inputs.3 The VAT policy 
affects both corn and soybeans equa lly and does not explain the divergent trends in trade 
between the two commodities. VAT rebates for exports (used mostly for corn) appear to be a de 
facto export subsidy. Delays in approving genetically-modified corn events and distribution of 
tariff rate  quotas in small lots may have constrained corn imports. Domestic policies that 
induced farmers to plant more grain beginning in 2004 and good weather increased domestic 
                            
3 Imports of several other types of animal feeds including fish meal, bran, distillers dried grains, and rapeseed meal 
are exempt from VAT (Latner and Jiang, 2007) and the VAT is sometimes waived for other commodities on an ad hoc 
basis. 
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supplies of corn. High ocean freight rates increased C&F prices of U.S. corn in Asia, but this 
factor also affected soybeans. 
 
 Figure 4: China Net Imports of Soybeans and Corn, 2000-2007 
 
Monthly domestic and border prices were compared over the period from 2002 to 2007 to 
assess the degree of protection of the corn and soybean markets. Monthly domestic wholesale 
prices by province were obtained from China National Grain and Oils Information Center, and 
converted to U.S. dollars at the official exchange rate for the corresponding month.  In Figures 5 
and 6, domestic prices are shown for a production area - Heilongjiang Province for soybeans 
and Jilin for corn - and for a coastal province - Shandong Province for soybeans and Guangdong 
for corn. The border price for soybeans was calculated as the average unit value of imported 
soybeans reported in China customs statistics. It was not possible to calculate an actual import 
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Source: USDA/FAS, PSD 
Note: Data are for market years October - September 
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Taiwan corn imports was used to approximate the price at the Chinese border.4 These border 
prices do not include tariffs or VAT. 
Domestic prices of both corn and soybeans were above border prices for most months of 
the period 2002-07 suggesting a modest level of protection. The border price of soybeans was 
consistently below the coastal (Shandong) domestic price, and usually below the price in inland 
production areas (Heilongjiang).  The monthly differential between the Shandong price and the 
border price averaged 21% over the period 2002-07, and it ranged mostly between 10 and 30%. 
After adding the tariff and value added tax, the cost of imported soybeans was still slightly 
below the domestic price in Shandong in most months. The border (Taiwan) price for corn was 
below the coastal (Guangdong) domestic price during most months of the  period 2002-07, but 
there were periods during 2003 and 2004 when the border price was at or above the domestic 
price. After adding the tariff and value added tax, the theoretical price of imported corn was at 
or above the Guangdong price during most of 2002-07. 
 
Figure 5: China Soybeans--Domestic and Border Prices, 2002-07 
 
                            
4 A border price was also calculated by adding average shipping costs (U.S. Gulf to East Asia) to the average U.S. 
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Source: China National Grain and Oils Information Center; China Customs Statistics 
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The  co-movements  between  prices  reveal  differences  in  liberalization  of  the  corn  and 
soybean  markets  in  China.    Fluctuations  in  domestic  soybean  prices  appear  very  closely 
correlated  with  fluctuations  in  the  border  price,  an  indicator  that  international  market 
conditions  are  transmitted  to  the  China  market.  Domestic  soybean  prices  in  coastal  and 
production regions of China move almost in unison, suggesting that price changes in one region 
are  quickly  transmitted  to  other  regions.  By  implication,  international  market  changes  are 
quickly transmitted to markets in soybean production areas. 
 
Figure 6: China Corn—Domestic and Border Prices, 2002-07 
 
 
Sources: China National Grain and Oils Information Center and Taiwan Customs Statistics 
 
Price trends for corn suggest that China‘s corn market is more insulated from the world 
market.  Like  domestic  soybean  prices,  domestic  corn  prices  in  production  areas  (Jilin)  and 
coastal areas (Guangdong) move together very closely, suggesting that domestic markets are 
closely  integrated.  However,  domestic  corn  prices  are  not  as  closely  linked  to  trends  in 
international prices. Sharp peaks in the border price of corn in 2004 and early 2007 are reflected 
by  contemporaneous—but  much  less  pronounced—peaks  in  Chinese  prices,  suggesting  that 
shocks to the world market do have some impact on the Chinese market. However, during 
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Chinese and international corn prices. These recent price trends suggest that the Chinese corn 
market is more insulated from the international market than is the soybean market.  
One of the major differences between China‘s corn and soybean markets during this period 
was  government  stock-holding.  China  held  large  government  reserves  of  corn  accumulated 
during the 1990s, but it did not hold large soybean reserves. The soybean market was driven by 
current-year  production  and  consumption  and  world  prices,  but  the  corn  market  was 
dominated  by  the  problem  of  disposing  of  huge  corn  stocks  without  depressing  domestic 
market prices. China sought to create new demand by developing livestock production, starch, 
and ethanol industries in corn production areas. The most important means of disposing of corn 
stocks was subsidized exports. The relatively stable domestic corn prices in China suggest that 
authorities succeeded in stabilizing the domestic corn market. However, stability came at great 
financial cost. 
 
Figure 7: China Corn: Domestic and Export Prices, 2002-07 
 
Source: China National Grain and Oils Information Center; China Customs Statistics 
 
China  agreed  to  end  subsidies  for  exports  after  WTO  accession,  but  corn  export  sales 
continued to be made at prices well below domestic prices after WTO accession (Figure 7).5 
                            
5 China now claims to offer only a rebate of VAT and waivers of rail taxes. Only two companies are authorized to 
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Since 2002, the unit value of corn exports has generally been 10%-20% below the wholesale 
price at Dalian in Liaoning Province, the main port for shipments of northeastern corn both to 
export markets and corn deficit areas in southern China. On average, the monthly average unit 
value  of  exports  was  $24  below  the  domestic  price  at  Dalian.  Calculations  based  on  China 
customs statistics show that China exported a cumulative total of 42 million metric tons of corn 
during 2002-06.6 These figures suggest that the total subsidy cost of corn exports over the period 
2002-06  was  roughly  $1  billion  (T able  3).  T he  policy  implicitly  taxed  feed  and  livestock 
producers in southern China, but those costs are difficult to quantify. 
 
Table 3: Estimated Subsidy Cost, Chinese Corn Exports, 2002-06 
  Unit  Total 
Cumulative exports  Million metric 
tons 
42 
Estimated subsidy per ton*  Dollars per 
metric ton 
24 
Estimated total cost**  Dollars  1 billion 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on data from China Customs Statistics and China National  
Grain and Oils Information Center 
*Average difference between value per ton of exports and domestic price at Dalian.  
** (Cumulative exports) x (subsidy per ton) 
 
Over the five-year period 2002-06 (calendar years) China‘s net imports of soybeans totaled 
105 mmt while exports of corn totaled 42 mmt. This policy has the appearance of supporting 
corn prices while allowing soybean prices to fall. In fact, there has been some agitation among 
soybean  interests  to  protect  local  farmers  from  imported  beans.  Lan (2006)  painted  a  bleak 
scenario  of  soybean  farmers  unable  to  sell  their  crops,  and  attributed  their  problems  to 
competition from imported soybeans. The Ministry of Agriculture (2006, p. 110) identified the 
increase in soybean imports as an adverse effect of WTO accession that prevented prices and 
farm incomes from rising.   
In fact, soybean imports have not driven down soybean prices—either in absolute terms or 
relative  to  corn.  Soybean  prices  increased faster  than  corn  prices  from  2002  to  2004,  before 
                                                                                         
exceeded  the  domestic  price during 2004  when  subsidized  exports were  suspended  due to  tight  domestic  grain 
market conditions. 
6 The cumulative corn export total for the decade from 1997 to 2006 was 74 million metric tons.  Gale  Chap.3:  A Tale of Two Commodities     77      
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falling  during  2004-06  (Figure  8).  Over  the  entire  2002-2007  period  there  was  no  long-term 
decline in soybean prices. By comparison, corn prices were relatively stable over that period. 
According  to  cost  of  production  survey  data  collected  by  the  National  Development  and 
Reform Commission Department of Price (2006), farm profits from both corn and soybean rose 
in 2003-05 (Figure 9). 
 
Figure 8: Comparison of Domestic Soybean and Corn Prices, Monthly 2002-07 
 
Chinese farmers did not abandon soybeans or corn after WTO accession. Soybean area 
remained at slightly less than 10 million hectares, and China‘s planted area in corn rose to an 
historical high in 2005 of 26.4 million hectares, exceeding the previous historical high reached in 








                            












Source: China National Grain and Oils Information Center 
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Figure 9: China Profit per Mu, Corn and Soybeans, 2001-05 
 
Figure 10: Planted area, corn and soybeans, 1992-2006 
 
An Ironic Plot Twist 
Since the 1990s, the conventional wisdom was that China‘s growing demand for corn to feed an 
expanding  livestock  herd  would  lead  to  rising  Chinese  imports,  boosting  grain  prices  and 
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Source: China National Bureau of Statistics 
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demand  emerged  in  the  form  of  soybean  imports  that  grew  beyond  most  forecasters‘ 
expectations. China‘s corn imports have not yet materialized. 
In 2006 and 2007, ―the best of times‖ finally emerged for U.S. corn producers. The Illinois 
farm price for corn surpassed $3.50 per bushel in 2007, up from less than $2 per bushel at the 
time of China‘s WTO accession. The new source of corn demand emerged not in China, but in 
the United States, in the form of the U.S. ethanol boom.  
The irony is that new demand for corn in the U.S. affected the China market, not the other 
way around. Prior to the ethanol boom, China‘s corn prices were rising gradually in 2005 and 
2006, reflecting a tightening of Chinese corn markets as corn stocks diminished and industrial 
demand for corn expanded. Several Chinese feed and starch companies imported 62,000 metric 
tons of U.S. corn in the first half of 2006 to test the mechanism for importing grain. No further 
purchases were made after the sharp rise in U.S. prices in Sept-Nov 2006 made corn imports 
more  expensive.  A  corresponding  jump  in  Chinese  domestic  corn  prices  in  Oct-Dec  2006 
(despite a good corn harvest in China) followed the spike in U.S. prices. Rising corn prices 
boosted feed costs, contributing to record pork prices in May 2007 and stoked concerns about 
food price ―inflation‖ in China. Partly as a result of the jump in Chinese corn prices, Chinese 
policymakers  declared  a  moratorium  on  new  grain-based  ethanol  and  starch  production 
projects.  
An Unfinished Story 
China has so far defied the forecasters and remained surprisingly self sufficient in food despite 
lowering trade barriers while at the same time maintaining stable domestic markets. There is 
still a lot we don‘t know about China. The level of grain stocks is unknown. The influence of 
food security on trade policy is unclear. Livestock statistics are sketchy and animal inventories 
and production numbers are probably overstated (Gale, Tuan, Fabiosa, and Zhang, 2007). The 
impacts of poultry and swine diseases on livestock inventories and feed demand are not well 
understood. China has defied modelers‘ acreage constraints by achieving a substantial boost in 
grain plantings in 2004 and 2005 while converting farmland to urban uses without substantially 
reducing acreage of other major crops.  
Of course, the story is not finished. Stories like this one take decades, not years, to run their 
course. Will China deplete its grain inventories?  Will food safety problems and environmental 
degradation force China to cut back on chemical use and sacrifice yields? Will China approve Gale  Chap.3:  A Tale of Two Commodities     80      
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domestic  production  of  genetically  modified  crops?  Will  China‘s  exchange  rate  appreciate 
against the dollar?  
We  can  be  certain  of  two  things.  More  unexpected  plot  twists  are  ahead.  Making 
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